Essay on Is America’s Military Over-Stretching in the South China Sea Promoting Conflict

There have been some alarming opinions in past years that China’s great power probable, combined with its latent imperialist ambitions and gradually self-assured foreign policy stance, could pose a threat to local and global security by prompting major power readjustments in East Asia and beyond, ultimately challenging US prevalence in the post–Cold War international system. Among the many serious security challenges confronting Asia, territorial and maritime conflicts over the areas of the South China Sea has emerged as major potential flashpoints, owing to military modernization in Beijing and Washington’s re-balancing to Asia. Given China’s continuing regional disputes with a number of its neighbors, notably Japan, the South China Sea conflict isn’t a one-off issue for authorities in China in Beijing. Instead, it is a crucial element of China’s overall rise, with more significant consequences for showing its ability to safeguard its welfares, image and sovereignty as a great power. Meanwhile, the China menace has prompted most Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations to back Washington’s reinvigorated attempts to “return” to Asia and strengthen security by US relationships with regional allies and partners. This tendency has turned the South China Sea into “a focal point for major power competition, thereby compounding the issues,” with potentially far-reaching regional ramifications. This does not certainly imply that China’s territorial solid claims will lead to war. Growing tensions between China and several Southeast Asian nations over the claimed seas of the South China Sea has come to be one of the region’s most potential severe flashpoints, making it a valuable indicator for assessing the “China menace.” Simultaneously, America’s managing of the “Asian problem” has become a litmus test for the upcoming direction of US importance, as the country faces critical opportunities to demonstrate its hegemonic suppleness, as well as its diplomatic and military skills in protecting its close associates while also steering its conflict with a rising China^[1]. This research paper will address some fundamental concerns concerning China’s ascent and how it undermines America’s dominance in Asia, emphasizing territorial struggles in the South China Sea.

Different principles surround the issue on the South China Sea. Getting an understanding of these principles will contribute to a better understanding of the position of the two nations over the matter. The first principle is the principle of not using coercion or force.^[2] The idea that force or coercion should not be used to settle conflicts between nations, especially not as a routine or first-resort option, has been a significant component of the US-led international order since World War II. Some commentators are concerned that China’s arrangements in the South China Sea, together with Russia’s arrangements in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, may help reinstate the quite diverse notion of might making right a regular or crucial feature of intercontinental affairs. The second principle is that of the liberty of the seas. The focus of freedom of the seas, which refers to the handling of the world’s oceans as global waters under international law and the release of operations in international waters, has been a significant component of the US-led global order since World War II.^[3] The liberty of the seas is also known as the liberty of navigation. However, the phrase is occasionally interpreted narrowly, especially by those who oppose freedom of the seas in its broadest sense, to mean simply the space for marketable ships to travel through marine regions, rather than the freedom for civilian and military boats and planes to undertake different operations. The actions by China in South China may have an impact on how the United States and other onlookers view the role of China as a significant world power, especially in regards to the approach by China to resolving international conflicts, including whether it considers power and coercion to be a suitable means of resolving such conflicts, and thus whether it trusts that “might makes right,” and China’s views near the Middle East. In general, China’s attitude to maritime conflicts in the South China Sea, as well as its attempts to improve its position in the South China Sea throughout time, may be summarized that China seems to have considered asserting and defending its oceanic regional assertions in the South China Sea, also increasing its position in the South China Sea, as vital national objectives. China appears to be pursuing these objectives through a multifaceted approach that encompasses informational, diplomatic, economic, paramilitary/law enforcement, military and civilian components. China looks to be tenacious, persistent, strategically flexible, prepared to invest substantial properties, and prepared to suffer at least part of the standing and other penalties that other nations may want to enact on China in reaction to China’s activities in implementing this integrated strategy.

This study aims to establish whether the military of the United States is over-stretching in the South China Sea, thereby promoting conflict. This will be done by looking into the contributions of the US Military to increasing the tension in the South China Sea. The United States’ land power in the South China Sea is critical to the region’s stability. The Special Operations Forces (SOF), Army, and Marine Corps of the United States offer special skills. In this semi-enclosed marine area, their defensive environment makes them less prone to escalation while yet delivering a clear message of committed support and consistent resolve to collaborators and competitors alike. This paper aims to demonstrate US land power as a vital component of regional security and stability by showing how its diverse capabilities are critical, indirectly supporting US objectives. Even in an environment dominated by Sea and air, land power’s vast functioning and diversified support competences in pursuit of gradually inter-reliant joint and united operations make it a vital component in achieving US goals. Land authority may be the most decisive, adaptable, and adaptable force in full-spectrum procedures, including everything from humanitarian aid to conventional state-on-state combat; land power is also critical to engaging, understanding, and influencing people and leaders. Because ground troops dominate this region’s military organization, US land power wields a unique influence.

The first of land power’s strategic responsibilities, to coerce or battle and win decisively, is more significant than is commonly recognized in a marine context. Through its theater opening and sustainment capabilities, the United States Army offers critical assistance to other troops and agencies. US land power is accountable for active and passive ways of protecting against foreign and internal coercions through its core capability of vast area security. The Army’s air and missile defense systems are important in this area-denial anti-access environment against preemptive strikes. The security function of land-based sea control via anti-ship missiles is momentous and significant in a semi-enclosed marine environment. However, it still requires operational development by US ground forces. Surface-to-surface missiles are used in the counter-land operation to provide a barrier against close-in assault systems deployed around the region. The ability to do a combined arms movement is another important talent. Amphibious activities in the South China Sea are useful during disasters and on the fringes of military processes.

The war between China and the United States might be so devastating for both nations, East Asia and the globe, that it may seem inconceivable. However, this is not the case: China and the United States are at odds over several regional issues that may lead to a military conflict or perhaps bloodshed between them. Both nations have substantial armed units operating close to one another. If an event occurs or a crisis flares up, both parties have an incentive to strike enemy troops before being struck by them. If war breaks out, both sides have enough forces, technology, industrial-strength, and personnel to battle across vast swaths of space, land, air-sea, and cyberspace. The potential of a military stalemate implies that nonmilitary reasons, in the end, may determine conflict. These should benefit the US both now and in the future. Although fighting would be detrimental to both countries, the damage to China’s economy may be catastrophic and long-lasting. Even a minor disagreement, if not resolved quickly, might harm China’s economy. A protracted and bloody conflict may devastate China’s economy, halt its hard-won progress, and inflict widespread misery and dislocation. Such economic harm might exacerbate political unrest and empower separatists in China. Domestic partisan skirmishing in the United States, on the other hand, may impede the war effort but not jeopardize social stability, much alone the State’s existence, no matter how lengthy and brutal the fight, as long as it remained conventional. While escalating cyber warfare is harmful to both sides, it may exacerbate China’s economic woes and hamper the government’s capacity to manage a restive people.

In the Asia-Pacific area, the South China Sea is crucial to the United States for three reasons: To begin with, it is an important transit course for maritime marketable traffic to and from East Asia, as well as the US Navy. Second, conflicts between China and many Southeast Asian nations, including one US ally, the Philippines, over ownership of China’s many small islands, reefs, atolls, and rocks are generating tensions that might escalate to violence and instability. ^[4] Finally, Beijing may eventually utilize its expanding power in the region to build a sphere of influence harmful to US interests. These considerations explain the United States’ attention to occurrences in the South China Sea, in addition to a set of rules aimed at ensuring access and transport, preventing or minimizing tensions, and supporting the nonviolent and legally based resolution of local conflicts. Regrettably, current US words and arrangements are not successfully attaining such goals, and rising tensions over the matter threaten to significantly disrupt the meaningful US-China relationship in needless ways.

The necessity to plan for conflict with China is made even more imperative by advancements in military technology and related doctrine. Sensors, global location, weapon guidance, digital networking, and other technologies used to target opposing troops have evolved to the point that both the United States and China’s armed forces represent significant dangers to each other. This gives both nations the capacity and incentive to strike enemy troops before they hit their own, which will affect both nations’ war strategies. Military technology and design are therefore predisposed to a quick exchange of attacks from the outset, with both sides are keen on gaining or denying the upper hand to the other.

There are around 180 features visible above water in the South China Sea through high current. These shoals, rocks, reefs, sandbanks, cays, and other unnamed submerged features and unnamed shoals may be found in four different parts of the Sea. In whole or in part, China Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all claim these areas. All of the terrestrial features in the South China Sea are claimed by Taiwan and China, which represent the Republic of China. This sticky power issue is aggravated by the “nine-dash line” (NDL), which is seen on all maps of China of the South China Sea (SCS) and includes approximately eighty percent of the SCS. Chinese activities in recent years have clearly recommended that the line is supplementary to simply a method to portray China’s entitlements to geographical characteristics; it is an effort to prove that China has “historic rights” to a substantial share of the properties that, under the Regulation of the Sea, is owned to coastal nations. This outward attempt to redraft “commonly understood” intercontinental regulation has resulted in several disagreements with its SCS neighbors. China’s South China Sea policy is “peacefully coercive.” It’s effective^[5]. It has been dubbed a “salami slice” because it remains to take small, steps that are not likely to draw a military retort from the other claimants but slowly change the status quo concerning contested claims in its favor over time, it has a winning strategy.

Washington maintains that UNCLOS enables governments to enact “high seas freedoms” in coastal nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which include, among other things, peaceful military actions. China, on the other hand, isn’t so sure. These behaviors, it argues, are not kind. This discrepancy has led to a mid-air crash in 2001 between a navy surveillance planes and an intercepting naval fighter from China and an incident in 2009 where the USNS Impeccable was harassed by Chinese fishing and by paramilitary ships. Another diplomatic quarrel was recently triggered by a hazardously close capture of a US Navy maritime patrol plane. Within the larger UNCLOS framework, the US and China differ on the extent to which UNCLOS and customary global maritime Law permit military actions within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which can spread up to 200 miles from a seaside shore or normal seaward islands of the state. The EEZ gives a coastal state “sovereign rights” to explore, use, and conserve natural possessions, as well as “jurisdiction” over activities like “scientific marine research” and “marine environment conservation and preservation.”^[6] The EEZ was created for the economic advantage of coastal governments, according to China and the United States, and vessels and planes from all countries have steering and permissions to fly in the EEZ. The two nations affect, however, on whether these truths apply to military arrangements conducted by state war vessels, planes, and naval auxiliaries.

The absence of any direct UNCLOS limitation on military exercises in the EEZ is important from the United States’ perspective when contrasted to wording restricting military action in other zones. Without the consent of the seaside State, the UN Convention on the regulation of the sea does not specify which military activities, if any, may be carried out in an EEZ. Nonetheless, the US maintains that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states and, more importantly, what it does not say, authorizes military measures. UNCLOS Article 87, according to the US, states that “the high seas are open to all nations and that high seas freedom is guaranteed.”.^[7] China controls almost the whole northern part of the South China Sea north of 12 degrees northern latitude. It has governed the Paracel Islands since 1974 and is unlikely to cede control, notwithstanding Vietnam’s claims. China concluded the dispute with the Philippines when it gained control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. It is unlikely to be abandoned once more. As a result, the Spratly Islands are the only lingering landscapes outside of China’s physical authority. This stance means that US policy selections aimed at reaching a passive, rules-based resolution should be focused on the Spratly, which are, sadly, the most complex and lawfully esoteric part of the South China Sea for those who must formulate and implement policy.

The US has repeatedly maintained the power to undertake military operations in EEZs worldwide, including China’s. The United States asserts these rights through opinions based on UNCLOS law, global state preparation, and UNCLOS conveying past. The UN Agreement on the Law of the Sea does not indicate which military actions, if any, may be performed in an EEZ short of the agreement of the coastal State. Nonetheless, the US claims that military actions are authorized by the UN Convention on the regulation of the sea states and, more significantly, what it does not say.^[8] According to the US, UNCLOS Article 87 stipulates that “the high seas are open to all nations” and “freedom of the high seas” consist of “freedom of overflight and navigation.” According to the US, “other internationally authorized uses of the sea” include military activity. The most substantial restriction on the right to free steering and overflight in the EEZ is that it be trained with “due respect to the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with UNCLOS and other principles of international law^[9]“. Again, the US claims that no delivery in the UN Convention on how the sea is regulated or other norm of global Law prohibits or allows China to prohibit US military boats and planes from participating in military actions in the EEZ. When likened to wording limiting military activity in other zones, the absence of any explicit UNCLOS restriction on military exercises in the EEZ is significant from the standpoint of the United States.

In general, state policy has encouraged military activity in the EEZ. China’s position that “the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea grants coastal nations the authority to restrict not just commercial operations, but also foreign military actions in their EEZs” is successfully shared by only twenty-seven other nations. Despite the fact that most countries have adopted laws that are similar to those of the United Governments, only a few states conduct military doings in foreign EEZs. Soviet intelligence ships, were during the Cold War, known as AGIs cruised the waters off the United States’ coasts. AGIs were so regularly behind US troops that US naval officials “joked about assigning the AGI a station in the development” of the operations of the fleet. During the Cold War, the mutual agreement between the US and the Soviets about military activity in the EEZ reflected each countries’ belief that their respective warships had the right to operate within the EEZs of the other^[10]. During the Cold War, the joint agreement between the US and the Soviets about military activity in the EEZ reflected each countries’ belief that their respective warships had the right to operate within the EEZs of the other.

China opposes the idea that military actions in a seaside state’s EEZ are lawful having no prior consent. This stance is “based on national security interests exclusive authority over maritime scientific research and resource management interests, and environmental protection interests.” To begin, China contends that the United States lacks power to make text-based opinions since it is not a party to the UN Convention on the Regulation of the Sea. Despite the fact that this argument has no legal consequences, it effectively diverges from China’s more challenging concerns. Furthermore, the United States’ desire to benefit from UNCLOS having not joined the Convention adds to the impression that the United States is still an intruding authority with minimal interest in true cooperation in the region.^[11] China’s basic UNCLOS textually-based debate is that military operations in the EEZ undertaken without the approval of the coastal State defy UNCLOS Article 301, which states that states “shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial sovereignty or political sovereignty of any State, or in any other manner incoherent with the principles of international law embodied in this Convention.” According to Chinese analysts, US military actions in the EEZ facilitate the collecting of data that might be used to assist military functioning against China, in defilement of Articles 301 and 88^[12].Local support for foreign surveillance processes might dwindle as well, especially if these activities are seen as damaging to overall US-China relations or if foreign surveillance operations are based on mutual rights for Chinese containers to conduct surveillance in US waters. The American public permitted Soviet AGIs in American seas during the Cold War, to the degree that it was aware, does not indicate that equivalent Chinese monitoring would be acceptable now. However, ASEAN has failed to persuade China to reevaluate its assertive maritime legal and political claims. China continues to put off developing a South China Code of Conduct with ASEAN. Chinese representatives have expressed a readiness to talk about a Code of Conduct in the past. As other nations want a quick remedy to their issues and hope to hammer out a code in a day, China favors a gradual approach. This approach is neither severe nor practical.

Beijing has sought to legitimize and defend its disputed South China Sea territorial claims (SCS). However, considering China’s growing militarization of the South China Sea during the last nine years, such a step looks unavoidable. In 2014, it finished work on extending the runway there to accommodate military aircraft.^[13] As indicated above, China has a lot to lose from the war. China is set to be economically darrained by the war. This will therefore affect its economic position. Both financially and militarily, China has evolved. China’s military capabilities have grown exponentially, as have the lethality, precision, range, and number of its weapons systems. On top of that, Beijing’s belligerent language and methods have intensified.

The South China Sea despite being a spot of immense geo-political conflict is also an environmental gem. The parties that are interested over the rights of the South China Sea, are interested in the natural resources, dominance, sovereignty over the territory, airspace and marine time in the region. Over the past, with the intensified conflict over the South China Sea, the claiming nations have accelerated their measures to claim sovereignty over the area. Artificial islands are being built around the region. This drastically increases the level of pollution across the region. Air and water pollution is on the rise due to the processes of building the artificial islands. The militarization of the South China Sea has also led to increased water and air pollution. The countries that claim sovereignty over the South China Sea have also increased their drilling for hydrocarbons. Not only does the drilling increase pollution rates, it also risks leaks and disrupts the ecosystem. All the nations that are pushing for sovereignty over the South China Sea have contributed to the environmental degradation experienced in the area. It is crucial that the interested nations stop degrading the environment for their own personal interests.

The conflicts over the sovereignty of South China Sea have caused unrest. The strategic geopolitical strategic region which is also rich in resources has led to a series of diplomatic spats and conflicts in the region. The tension in the region is on the rise as the countries militarize the region. The militarization by the countries may restrict nautical free movement in the region. The disputes do limit open and free navigation through the region. Fuel has been poured to the fire by national pride, commerce and military aspirations and historical and symbolic ties. Confrontations between carriers of aircraft, fishing vessels, bombs and seaplanes filled by different claims in the area have caused deadly standoffs, demonstrations and bad diplomatic ties. The conflict has led to the death of hundreds of people. This shows that the conflict affects individuals which may be often overlooked.

The US must explicitly indicate its strong support for Southeast Asian governments, both those involved in the conflict and other ASEAN members, all of whom are being courted economically by China. China’s goal is to encourage these governments to join China rather than balance against China on the side of the US. Already, a number of ASEAN member nations are staunchly pro-China, notably Cambodia, which looks to be enabling China to establish a base on its soil, and the Philippines, which appears to be moving toward China. Conflicts for sovereignty of the South China Sea put ASEAN’s capacity to manage regional security, safeguard its members’ economic and environmental interests, and retain its credibility as a legitimate international organization in jeopardy. Although a peaceful deal would benefit all parties, intrastate rivalry over the region and resource allocation has hampered negotiations. Despite diverse views and objectives among ASEAN member states and other regional powerhouses, it is critical to examine ASEAN’s actions in the political-security arena in order to recommend methods to strengthen the organization’s contribution to conflict resolution. ASEAN may also pave the way for regional collaboration and serve as a model for other nations seeking to create a more effective and focused organization. The fact that there is presently a schism between nations that has not hampered the formation of international forums demonstrates that ASEAN is a more stable institution than the EU. As a result of ASEAN, Asia has witnessed an increase in the number of venues where nations may speak freely, which aids in the development of trust. As a result, ASEAN will be able to utilize its standing to influence regional politics in the future.

In the absence of a solution to the concerns, it is important to preserve a peaceful settlement. Because of their adherence to the Law of the Sea agreement, all claimant nations are committed to achieving a peaceful settlement. A peaceful conclusion should be a key component of ASEAN’s efforts to resolve territorial disputes. Without the goal of peace, ASEAN will effectively disintegrate as an organization. The latest Code of Conduct that China has originally signed is a step in the right way, and it is consistent with the goal of keeping the region peaceful. It is critical to avoid unforeseen events and escalation. Only until these two prerequisites are met will ASEAN be able to create methods to both stabilize and mediate conflict.

Because the South China Sea is a vital commercial corridor through which one-third of the world’s shipping passes, China aims to strengthen its control there. Seafood and oil deposits abound in the water^[14]. Though the United States is not claiming, it has had a legal dispute with China about the US Navy’s legal authority to conduct intelligence collection in Chinese seas. According to the president, the United States and Japan have a formal military alliance that includes disputed areas. Although Washington’s military ties with Manila are shakier, Philippine authorities are seeking a territory guarantee in the same vein. The economic gains of control are genuine, but they are still insignificant in comparison to the economies of most claimants. The United States has few and minor interests. Washington is primarily concerned with upholding global standards, such as navigational freedom and peaceful dispute settlement in this situation. Rather than provoking China, the administration should get out of East Asia’s territorial quagmire. To begin, Washington should recognize that East Asian hegemony is not necessary for American security. The government should let events unfold in their own time. China’s neighbors are becoming more hostile as a result of Beijing’s assertiveness.^[15] Washington should emphasize the benefits of peace for all parties involved, including China. The future should not be jeopardized for such minor stakes.

All parties that claim sovereignty should work together to ensure that peace is maintained. To do this, strategic discussions should be held among the interested parties. They should develop a diplomacy roadmap and present their issues on their standing on the South China Sea. All interested nations, including the US and China, should respect each other’s territorial claims, access, resource control, and military activities. The US should, in global interest, reinforce the continued membership of China in UNCLOS. It is also crucial to maintain peace when China asks for permission to conduct military operations in the South China Sea and the EEZ. US and China should consult each other to resolve informal misunderstandings. They should both agree on a mutual notification while transiting on these waterways.

It is also essential that a joint survey on the South China Sea’s environmental health is conducted. This will bring attention to the environmental degradation that is currently facing the area. It will also help to bring about measures to ensure that joint projects on improving the state of the environment are put up. We should propose an environmental resource commission. The commission should ensure the interested parties support the conservation measures for the marine environment. It is also necessary that the claimants do establish collaboration centers on marine science. All interested parties should declare preservation zones in the South China Sea. They should also come up with an understanding of access and use of the South China Sea. The measures suggested above may be subjected to criticism, seem one-sided or farfetched. The measures may help to drive for change in the South China Sea. If observed, they will lead to the conservation of the environment, promote security, increase stability and work toward common interests of the South China Sea. Discussions on what is at stake could help improve the general outcome of the prevailing situation.

Coming up with a coordination spiral on South China Sea will not only help avert the wasteful arms in the area or averting conflict, it could also lead to improving adherence and definition of the agreed maritime practices. Forming a cooperation will also help to solidify the international understanding around the de facto administrative control and the understanding around the status quo of the South China Sea and its land features. Currently there are several issues and conflicting interests in the South China Sea. Full cooperation of the interested parties is essential and vital for ensuring that peace prevail and that they benefit from the region.

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[1] Jihyun Kim, “Accept Terms and Conditions on JSTOR,” www.jstor.org, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26271078.pdf.

[2] Claus Kreß, “On the Principle of Non-Use of Force in Current International Law,” Just Security, September 30, 2019, https://www.justsecurity.org/66372/on-the-principle-of-non-use-of-force-in-current-international-law/.

[3] Xuechan Ma, “The South China Sea Dispute: Perspective of International Law,” Atlantisch Perspectief 40, no. 3 (2016): 39–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48581297.

[4] Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (September 2017): 435–66, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12658.

[5] Darshana M. Baruah, “South China Sea: Beijing’s ‘Salami-Slicing’ Strategy,” The South China Sea Disputes, January 19, 2017, 255–58, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0060.

[6] James Houck and Nicole Anderson, “And Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea, 13 Wash. U. Global Stud,” L. Rev, 2014, https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1230&context=fac_works.

[7] United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 1982, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

[8] Ronald Umali Mendoza, Charles Siriban, and Tea Jalin Ty, “SURVEY of ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS of MARITIME and TERRITORIAL DISPUTES,” Journal of Economic Surveys 33, no. 3 (January 28, 2019): 1028–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12311.

[9] Martijn Hoogeland, “Case Note: The South China Sea Dispute and the Role of UNCLOS in the Settlement of the Dispute,” Revue Québécoise de Droit International, 2019, 93, https://doi.org/10.7202/1068733ar.

[10] Michael Mcdevitt and Catherine Lea, “CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop One: The Yellow and East China Seas,” 2012, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DCP-2012-U-001959-final.pdf.

[11] R. Pedrozo, “Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone,” Chinese Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 9–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmq007.

[12] Camille Goodman, “Rights, Obligations, Prohibitions: A Practical Guide to Understanding Judicial Decisions on Coastal State Jurisdiction over Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33, no. 3 (August 22, 2018): 558–84, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-12323082.

[13] Gregory Poling, “Spratly Airstrip Update: Is Mischief Reef Next?,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/new-imagery-release/.

[14] Marvin Ott, “The South China Sea in Strategic Terms,” Wilson Center, May 14, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-south-china-sea-strategic-terms.

[15] Matthew Pennington, “China to US: Stay out of South China Sea Talks,” Business Insider, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-china-to-us-stay-out-of-south-china-sea-talks-2017-10?r=US&IR=T.