Essay on Was London Prepared for the Outbreak of the Second World War?
Number of words: 7381
Introduction
In this essay I will analyse whether London was prepared for the outbreak of World War Two. Firstly it is important to decide upon the interpretation of London. Phillip Ziegler shows there are numerous ways of defining London, he believes that citizens presume knowledge and do not seek to define what is meant by ‘London’.[1] Some scholars state that London is an area eighteen miles wide and twenty miles deep,[2] however Ziegler settled upon the traditional London County Council (LCC) definition of London in his academic work.[3] The LCC was an organisation referred to as a “state within a state” by Angus Calder, due to its great power and influence. The LCC definition of London would have been an accurate clarification of what London was during the period of war.[4] I will be using the LCC definition of London for the purpose of this assignment.
The date of the outbreak of the Second World War also needs definition. This may seem simple; most would state that it was 3rd September 1939 when Britain’s ultimatum for Germany’s withdrawal from Poland expired.[5] This date initiated a period known as the “phoney war”, (Americanism),[6] which lasted until the beginning of the Blitz, on 7th September 1940.[7] Historians such as Robert Mackay argue that the experience of this period by civilians was more of an inconvenience than a war and it received the epithet by the British as the “Bore War”[8]. Historians also argue that during this period, any provisions which had been put in place were unnecessary, as nothing happened.[9] This would make it very difficult to assess London’s preparedness, as there was no incident concerning the enemy with which to test it against.[10] Based upon the work of historians like Ziegler and Calder I will be using the beginning of the Blitz as my criterion for the outbreak of war. This was when London first engaged with its adversary within the Capital, which arguably allows for London’s preparation to be shown in practice. The Blitz also marked a point in a change of tactics from Germany, who in August 1940 had a fleet of reduced numbers due to the Norwegian Campaign. The Germans now looked to the Luftwaffe, who was still numerically strong, to gain ascendancy in the air and make an invasion more realistic[11]. This change of tactics could show the Blitz was a new war, which would have a separate outbreak date, a war which civilians were now at the front line.
There is much historiographical debate surrounding whether London was, or was not prepared for war. The debate itself has also become immersed in wider debates, such as the ‘Blitz Myth’ dispute.[12] Mackay for example believes overall London was unprepared for war, due to the belief that war would be avoided.[13] An idea supported by Richard Titmuss, who feels other cities were far more prepared than London.[14] However historians such as Hylton argue that in some ways, London was unevenly prepared for certain scenarios of war, i.e. the preparation for defending London against attacks was ill prepared, whilst preparation for dealing with the potential large numbers of casualties, was thoroughly planned.[15] Hylton’s argument alludes to the notion that in some instances London was prepared for war, but was not in others, a view I concur with that I will demonstrate within the body of this essay.
The argument I will pursue also highlights that individual provisions and actions of preparation, should be explored as separate microcosms of a larger macrocosm in the overarching war preparations. Therefore I will be assessing whether London was prepared for the outbreak of war by separately exploring individual provisions London created to protect itself during the war. The first half of this essay will be dedicated to the cocooning tactics of London, such as sheltering and evacuation. The second section will contain information on how London, in order to protect itself, planned to create offensive tactics. The forward planning and subsequent successes of these provisions and actions could allude to the notion that London was in fact prepared. I must also acknowledge that I will not be exploring examples of untested government provisions. Historians could argue for example, that providing gas masks to the entire population of London showed good preparation by the government,[16] but, as London was never involved in gas warfare, I believe its effectiveness cannot be reliably measured. This essay will be focused on preparation for and circumstances which occurred, rather than events which London expected to happen.
Context
World War One and the Spanish Civil War were two occurrences which were pivotal to London’s war preparation. London had already experienced aerial bombardment during The First World War; for example, on the 13th June 1917, 162 civilians were killed in a bombing raid on the East End.[17] It seems lessons were learned from such occurrences faced during World War One and were utilised during preparation for the outbreak of World War Two.[18] Dorothy Sheridan argues that the Spanish Civil war also offered Londoners a view of the effect aerial bombing could have,[19] although this does not necessarily mean Spanish policy was emulated.[20] David Child’s view is that this added to the potential fear for both civilians and government.[21] They are also the reason for Baldwin’s proposition that “the bomber will always get through”, which caused London to embark on policies aimed at damage limitation.[22]
Shelters
Clive Ponting argues that shelter provision was poorly planned by the government.[23] This means Londoners were not only poorly protected but the government was unprepared for war. During the First World War civilians hid in underground stations from air raids. After the raids had ended some individuals would not leave the relative safety of the underground, which became known as ‘shelter mentality’. The Government believed this would occur again during World War Two raids so they banned people from sheltering in the Underground.[24] For similar reasons, purpose-built deep shelters were not provided.[25] Yet if these two types of shelter had been used from the beginning of the bombardment 50% of civilian deaths could have been avoided.[26] This shows that in this context London was not prepared for war as the government failed to provide shelters, (or even allow for the use of subways), for the public, which would have saved lives
Instead of deep level shelters, the government promoted Anderson shelters. There were various flaws in the provision of these shelters, not least that a garden was required for its use. Some civilians such as Kathleen Carr, (a 13 year old civilian living in the Borough at the outbreak of war), did not have a garden, therefore she had nowhere to build an Anderson, and was therefore unprotected.[27] The Anderson shelters could not be properly heated and were easily flooded,[28] causing severe discomfort and illness. For example one mother developed Lumbago from the damp and cold conditions in her shelter.[29] Obtaining a free Anderson Shelter was subject to means testing leading to disparity in some localities.[30] The government did not equally protect its citizens and what protection they did provide was flawed and caused equally hazardous consequences to users, showing in terms of shelter provisions, London was not prepared for war
The government spent too long on preparation for the arguably inadequate Anderson shelter, when it possibly should have been working on potentially more successful alternatives. The short-falls concerning the preparation of shelter provision is also shown by the fact that Anderson Shelters were replaced by Morrison Shelters in 1941.[31] It was also decided that deep shelters were needed, but by the time their production was finished it was arguably too late, as they only begun in March 1941, two months before the Blitz ended.[32] Deep shelters had great potential for protection, as was shown in the Spain during the Civil War.[33] Scholars argue that this was recognised by the government in 1937 but they disregarded these facts, as they were more worried about ‘shelter mentality’.[34] Local councils were no better and did not begin building shelters even when instructed; it was often left to private enterprise.[35] This shows London was not prepared for war as it did not effectively shelter its citizens, despite evidence being available to them which would have aided their operation.
Mackay has a different interpretation, arguing that shelter provisions were well prepared, and were designed even before other data, (such as information on high explosives), had been obtained.[36] Ziegler notes that shelters were one form of preparation that citizens could see being prepared swiftly after the Munich Crisis, (an international crisis occurring due to Hitler’s ultimatum concerning the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia).[37] However, just because they were prepared quickly did not mean they were adequate, for example, a shelter created in Hyde Park was designed to be straight, with vertical lines, this was flaw which could have resulted in many casualties, meaning it had to be rectified.[38] Even though figures suggest that 92% of Londoners could be accommodated within shelters, both public and private,[39] they were of poor quality and inadequate for their purpose. This suggests that concerning shelters, London was not in fact unprepared as the government had failed to create effective shelter provision.
Once the preparations were put to the test, the government found that they had to adapt quickly using existing provisions, as their own creations were simply not adequate. For example after just two weeks after the beginning of the Blitz some seventy Underground stations became “would be shelters”, even though originally the government had attempted to forbid the use of tube stations for this purpose.[40] The government also added extra trains to the railway service which took South Londoners to Chislehurst in order to use the cave system for protection.[41] In many ways this plan could also be viewed as flawed, particularly when considering the potential danger of being caught in an air raid whilst on a train to Chislehurst. This shows London was unprepared for war as it became over reliant on other facilities to shelter its public, despite the disadvantages that came with attempting to use them.
As Calder states communal shelters in many cases were not comfortable, (an initiative purposely done to prevent users staying no longer than was necessary) or even hygienic, [42] for example the Tilbury shelter, which had particularly unhealthy conditions[43]. Arguably, because they prevented civilian deaths comfort need not be a priority, but the health risk through damp and other poor conditions was an issue within shelters. John Carr, an eye witness to the vile conditions within his local shelter, (a shop which had been requisitioned by the local authorities), stated that despite feeling safe within this shelter, it was often used as a public lavatory,[44] an issue that would carry its own health hazard. With regards to shelters, London was not prepared for war as it failed to protect the people in ways which would not cause discomfort or carry risk of disease.
Evacuation
Evacuation was a scheme which arranged for school children to be moved to a destination away from the bombardment.[45] This was intended to save the lives of children living in London at the start of the war.[46] This also had the added advantage of releasing parents to work in war industries;[47] Sheridan believes it was a successful scheme, which proved effective preparation and good organisation.[48] Evacuation was originally suggested by the Warren Fisher Committee, influenced by the example of a school in Getafe, Madrid which was bombed in October 1936.[49] Before the war in 1938 the LCC took responsibility for the scheme and implemented its own evacuation plans. The LCC addressed all eventualities within its planning of evacuation. Journeys for both those travelling privately and publicly were organised,[50] and schools were evacuated to the same area to prevent homesickness.[51] Even those returning to, or staying in London had schooling provided for them by the LCC from 1940.[52] The foresight of the LCC to plan and implement such an exploit shows London was prepared for war
Pam Schweitzer agrees that evacuation had been meticulously planned, for example, consent forms to evacuate children were given to parents as early as September 1938.[53] Also, rehearsals for evacuation took place in many London schools before Britain’s ultimatum to Germany had expired,[54] showing London was prepared well in advance of the Blitz to effectively evacuate the children of London. It could be said that the LCC had over prepared for evacuation; statistics indicate that Cambridge was prepared to receive 24,000 evacuees but only received 6,700, and half of those returned within six months, although this could also suggest that parents were not emotionally prepared in the end, to send their children to be evacuated[55]. The efficiency of preparation has been commented upon by numerous scholars,[56] despite the difficulty in the task the LCC succeeded in evacuating the children.[57]. The evacuations which took place without LCC intervention, such as examples of children leaving London to stay with relatives,[58] also shows many were aware of the issues of war and were prepared to make the sacrifice of not seeing their children to ensure their safety, this also alludes to a well prepared Capital. This combined with the swift, well organised evacuation scheme leads me to believe London was prepared for war.
In contrast, other historians are more critical in their assessment in respect to evacuation.[59] This is particularly concerned with the fact that by January 1940 some 20,000 children had returned from evacuation and there are also numerous cases of children being “snatched” back from billeting offices by their parents.[60] Children were constantly returning home from evacuation which in many ways undermined the usefulness of the project. It could be suggested poor preparation of evacuation was to blame for the return of the evacuees, such as mandatory Billeting, arguably leading to bitterness and the poor treatment of some evacuees, causing children to return home.[61] Eileen Wells wrote home complaining of her treatment and as a result was brought home by her parents,[62] meaning she had returned to a dangerous situation, like many other children.
Figures suggest 1 in 6 evacuees brought infestations such as lice to their new country homes during the 1939 evacuation.[63] Some would argue that evacuation upset the moral of the Londoners by highlighting the poverty of their families.[64] The highlighting of poverty was a negative nuance that surrounded evacuation and may have had some impact on its overall effectiveness, however as Parson notes, mass evacuation in 1940 did require a medical check precede it.[65] Evacuation had to be done swiftly in 1939 and issues concerning a negative reflection on one’s economic situation are of secondary importance compared to the safety of their children. London was still prepared as it safely evacuated the children, it is just unfortunate that this caused poor Londoners to have a negative reflection upon themselves.
However, despite these flaws, I concur with Parsons who argues that the biggest obstacle to evacuation was the independent thoughts and actions of the parents which could not be controlled. [66] Even if evacuation only temporarily protected children from raids this has to be seen at least a partial success. For example, one evacuee returned for Christmas, just before 29th December, the worst bombing raid on London,[67] but she had previously missed almost 4 months of raids, so her overall risk was greatly reduced. Children returning home from evacuation were not a reflection on government planning, and were at least protected for a time, and this does not suggest London was unprepared.
Fighting Back
Newspaper articles published pre-Blitz noted that it seems “hard to conceive winning a war by defence alone”.[68] A good physical offence was needed for a well rounded defence of London, measures such as the Anti Aircraft, (AA), gun and Barrage Balloons (BB) were introduced. Hylton believes that such defences were, “not in good shape” at the beginning of the Blitz period,[69] this view is supported by Victor T.C Smith who notes that Germans exploited gaps within AA guns sighted at the Thames, a problem not rectified until 1942[70]. Even Churchill alludes to an over-reliance on radar systems which did have faults,[71] shown on September 6th when the Royal Air Force shot down three of its own planes due to technical blunder.[72] Similar issues existed with the BB, which were prepared swiftly after the Munich Crisis, but also caused problems for London, for example when it became entangled and caused damage to railway lines.[73] I believe the poor quality of weaponry left London more susceptible to attack and shows in this context they were less prepared for war.
It could be argued London was poorly equipped, and therefore unprepared to fight back against raids, because the idea that “the bomber will always get through” held greater currency. More effort was placed into cocooning citizens from harm rather than striking back. Calder offers two historical arguments concerning rearmament, one being that there was a failure to sufficiently rearm and therefore have the equipment to protect the Capital. [74] Mackay believes long standing neglect by the government towards machinery was one reason why the creation of defensive equipment was unsuccessful.[75] This failing by the government, either through lack of preparatory work on equipment, or undertaking the wrong tactic means London was not able to protect itself, focusing more on damage limitation, proving London was ill-prepared for war.
Other historians are of the opinion that following the Munich Crisis, (some 2 years before the Blitz), there was great improvement in the preparation of defences.[76] However in my opinion this does not necessarily mean that the improvement was significant enough to evaluate there defences as well prepared. Similarly, evidence does suggest that AA industry expansion took place as early as 1936,[77] but despite this, its effectiveness was arguably limited to the destruction of allied crafts, which also alludes to poor training.[78] There is also evidence to suggest that more Luftwaffe were killed by landing or takeoffs than by London’s AA defences.[79] The preparation surrounding the creation of such defensive equipment as AA guns would have required meticulous planning. However, a case study concerning the Woolwich Arsenal shows that although it may have embarked on a steady increase in production from 1935,[80] the factory was still working overtime to restore itself to full working order as late as 1938.[81] Such evidence leads me to oppose historians such as Brigadier Hogg, who argues there was a steady transition from peace to a war time production was successful.[82] Preparation may have begun speedily after incidences such as the Munich Crisis, but the quality they produced was not sufficient enough to protect efficiently, therefore in terms of its defensive capabilities, London was not prepared for war.
Possibly one advantage of London’s defences appears to be its morale boosting qualities, supported by personal accounts.[83] As Mackay suggests, enemy bombing was aimed at breaking civilian spirits.[84] If possibly ineffective, yet visually noticeable, signs of civil defence aided morale and stopped civilian distress then arguably it prevented the Luftwaffe achieving its aim. Other accounts conversely show that eventually some citizens realised mid-Blitz that defences were futile against the onslaught of Luftwaffe, and this morale boosting feature ceased to be an advantage.[85] Weapons needed foremost to be effective at preventing enemy attacks and destruction, therefore this argument seems weak, and I conclude that London was less prepared for war as its weaponry failed to achieve its primary function.
Women in War Industries
Raynes Minns notes that Churchill acknowledged that a successful war effort could not have been achieved without the aid of women.[86] It could be argued that the situation for the mobilisation of women pre-Blitz was in a weaker position than it possibly should have been, showing a lack of preparation. The numbers of women in employment had only slightly increased from 1921 to 1931;[87] similarly, the proportion of women in engineering jobs did not notably rise 1923-1939.[88] Summerfield also argues that there were few legal restrictions upon women within employment pre-war therefore there was less to prevent mobilisation of this workforce.[89] Historians also argue that women were accepted into the workforce, (as they were during the First World War), meaning there should have been no deterrent for women volunteering to work in war industries.[90] Despite this, the number of female workers still wasn’t significantly great before the war, and in fact did not reach its peak of 75% of the entire labour force until after 1941.[91] It could be argued that historical and current working context of women should have aided women into the workforce, yet numbers of women in war industries were still not of a considerable number, which would indicate a lack of preparation.
I concur with evidence revealed by Penny Summerfield, who demonstrates the treatment of women in the pre-war years may have not been as progressive as envisaged by other historians. It was argued that women in factories had a negative influence on male colleagues as it created a flirtatious atmosphere, causing a distraction to workers,[92] it was also assumed women would not work the extra shifts and Sundays required.[93] Interestingly similar misconceptions prevented recruitment during World War One.[94] Arguably, London’s industries were still not ready to allow women fully into the workforce, meaning they weren’t fully prepared for the outbreak of war as women’s participation was necessary for its success. This served to folly the recruitment process and many women were disillusioned after being rejected for numerous civil defence jobs. As a consequence their skills were wasted, leaving London less prepared for war.[95]
Sheridan argues that the nature of Bevin’s non-conscript mobilisation before 1941,[96] made for a specialised work force.[97] However, eventually legislation was introduced by Bevin in 1941 outlining the conscription of women into the workforce, originally just for women between the ages of 20-30 years but subsequently extended.[98] This could be seen as an acknowledgement that the voluntary system was failing. This suggests possibly that if it had been used earlier then there would have been more women in the workforce, making London more prepared for the war. Raynes Minns disputes such claims, arguing that many women were passionate enough to take up arms and physically fight for their nation.[99] However this can be seen as irrelevant, as it was officially discouraged which means their passion was not constructed fully into the war industries,[100] leaving London less prepared.
Daily Mail publications from the period argue that the organisation concerning the mobilisation of women into the workforce was “awful” and doomed from the start.[101] This claim is supported by arguments suggesting that government advice concerning women was extremely conflicting, at first their function was to keep house for the returning troops, but as the situation concerning the war changed so did the governments attitude.[102] This was possibly led by Churchill, whose attitude was that women in work would lower morale and cause dissatisfaction amongst the troops.[103] In many ways the preparatory actions surrounding the mobilisation of women into the workforce was slack, for example the lack of government legislature concerning working women 1939-1940.[104] This could be the reason why recruits like Whiteman and Church-Bliss did not join Morrisons Engineering Works until February 1942,[105] after the Blitz had ended. There was also a lack of collective child-care facilities, which was only eventually provided in 1943, aided by the Ministry of Labour.[106] These difficulties must lead me to believe that legislatively and socially women were not fully utilised into the workforce, therefore, in this context, London was unprepared for the outbreak of war.
Conclusion
To conclude, like Hylton I am of the opinion that in some ways London was prepared for war, but in others ways was not. Upon viewing the evacuation of London there is a strong argument to suggest the LCC did an extremely competent job. Evacuation was both thoroughly planned and well executed as children were safely moved from the capital away from air raids. Evacuation was so well arranged that areas such as Cambridge were well under their expected quota of children. Historians, who are more critical of evacuation such as Calder, tend to spotlight the numbers of children who returned home, and how evacuation demonstrated the poor economic condition of Londoners. This seems overcritical; as one’s less than favourable fiscal position can be seen as less imperative than a child’s safety. These points therefore should be no reflection on London’s preparatory skill.
When one views other aspects of London’s preparation, however, the picture becomes more pessimistic. Despite experiencing the need for shelter provisions during the First World War, London’s preparation still left much to be desired. The Anderson shelters the government did provide would not have protected the whole of the capital, particularly those without gardens. The governments own attempts at public shelters were either poorly designed or unhygienic. Various issues also existed in the creation of London’s defensive equipment in factories such as the Woolwich Arsenal. Granted, the pace of production did increase after the Munich crisis, but this did not leave sufficient time to fully arm London for a considerable fight back. The equipment that was created also failed to serve its purpose, shown by the AA guns which only served to raise morale pre-Blitz, rather than destroy enemy craft and effectively protect the capital. Women were given contradictory advice about their place in war preparation, making the numbers who were recruited lower in the crucial years preceding the war, in comparison to the high numbers involved in war industries after the Blitz had ended.
Historians like Harrison state that the Blitz failed to destroy the morale of the people.[107] This could be used as evidence to support an argument that London must have been prepared for war, as it survived it. However, one must take into account other occurrences which aided London’s success. For instance, as mentioned earlier, many Luftwaffe Aircrafts were, (luckily for London), destroyed upon landing and takeoff. Moreover the Blitz ended on the May 10th 1941 due to a change in German tactics, and raids during the Blitz were not held every night, often due to poor weather.[108] These occurrences aided London’s success and had no correlation to its preparatory work. The excellent work behind performing the seemingly insurmountable task of evacuation appears to be London’s only saving grace to show it was prepared, concerning other preparatory measures in my opinion it failed. This leads me to conclude that in some ways London was prepared for war, but in other ways it certainly was not.
Bibliography
Books
Sue Bruley, Working for victory, a diary of life in the Second World War factory (Sutton Publishing, 2002)
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Angus Calder, The peoples War, Britain 1939-1945 (Pimlico, 1992)
David Childs, Britain since 1939, Progress and decline, second edition (Palgrave, 2002)
Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1, the gathering storm (Cassell and Co.Ltd 1967)
Winston S Churchill, The Second World War Volume 3, The Grand Alliance (Cassell and Co.Ltd, 1950)
Mark Connelly, We can take it, Britain and the memory of the Second World War (Pearson Education Limited, 2004)
Richard Croucher, Engineers at War 1939-1945 (Merlin Press, 1982)
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Juliet Gardiner, The 1940s house (Pan Macmillan Ltd, 2002)
Juliet Gardiner, Wartime Britain 139-1945 (Headline Book Publishing, 2004)
Ed Glinert, East End Chronicles (Penguin Group, 2005)
Nigel Gray, The Worst of times, an oral history of the Great Depression in Britain (Wildwood House Limited, 1985)
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Roy Masters, The Royal Arsenal, Woolwich (Alan Sutton Publishing, 1995)
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Jeremy Noakes, The Civilian in war, the home front in Europe, Japan and the USA in World War 2 (University of Exeter Press, 1992)
Martin L Parsons, I’ll take that one, dispelling the myths of civilian evacuation 1939-45 (Beckett Karlson Ltd, 1998)
Clive Ponting, 1940 Myth and reality (Elephant paperbacks, 1993)
Pam Schweitzer, Goodnight Children Everywhere, memories of evacuation in World War 2 (Age Exchange Theatre Trust, 1990)
Dorothy Sheridan, Wartime women, a Mass Observation anthology, 1937-45 (Phoenix, 2000)
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Internet and Video resources
“The London Blitz, 1940,” Eyewitness to History, (Retrieved 20th November 2010) <www.eyewitnesstohistory.com>
“Prelude to war”, World War 2 timeline, (retrieved 22nd November 2010) < http://www.ukessays.com/essay-writing-help/oxford-referencing.php>
Francis Beckett, Remembering the blitz (Retrieved 20th November 2010) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/sep/07/remembering-the-blitz-francis-beckett>
DIRECTOR “Their Past, your future, using Second World War and post film to explore London’s history, DVD”, London Metropolitan Archives (Viewed 19th November 2010)
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Russell Bodine, WWII: the London blitz of 1940, (Retrieved 4th January 2011) <http://www.essortment.com/all/hitlerchurchill_rnmd.htm>
Primary Sources
London Metropolitan Archives, 67.0 ILN, The illustrated London News, August 10th, 1940
London Metropolitan Archives, 67.0 ILN, The illustrated London News, September 28th, 1940
(J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
(K. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd, 2010)
[1] Phillip Ziegler, London at War 1939-45 (Pimlico, 2002) p.2
[2] DIRECTOR, Their Past, your future, using Second World War and post film to explore London’s history, DVD, London Metropolitan Archives (Viewed 19th November 2010)
[3] Ziegler, London, pp.2-3
[4]Angus Calder, Thepeople’s War, Britain 1939-1945 (Pimlico, 1992) p.199
[5] Robert Mackay, The Test of War, inside Britain 1939-45 (Routledge, 2003) p.6
[6] Ziegler, London, pp.179
[7] Ziegler, London, pp.179
[8] Mackay, The Test, p.7
[9] Ziegler, London, p.64
[10] Calder, The People’s, p.33
[11]Russell Bodine, WWII: the London blitz of 1940, (Retrieved 4th January 2011) <http://www.essortment.com/all/hitlerchurchill_rnmd.htm>
[12] Mark Connelly, We can take it, Britain and the memory of the Second World War (Pearson Education Limited, 2004) p.26
[13] Mackay, The Test, p.46
[14] Mackay, The Test, p.132
[15] Stuart Hylton, Their darkest hour, the hidden history of the home front 1939-45 (Sutton Publishing, 2006) p.136; Hylton, Their darkest, p.123
[16] Robert Mackay, Half the battle: civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester University Press, 2002) p.36
[17] Ziegler, London, p.9
[18] Calder, The peoples, p.73
[19] Dorothy Sheridan, Wartime women, a Mass Observation anthology, 1937-45 (Phoenix, 2000) p.27
[20] Francis Beckett, Remembering the blitz (Retrieved 20th November 2010) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/sep/07/remembering-the-blitz-francis-beckett>
[21] David Childs, Britain since 1939, Progress and decline, second edition (Palgrave, 2002) p.34
[22] Mackay, Half, p.31
[23] Clive Ponting, 1940 Myth and reality (Elephant paperbacks, 1993) p.166
[24] Ziegler, London, p.10
[25] Mackay, The Test, p.127
[26] Ziegler, London, p.135
[27] (K. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd, 2010)
[28] Juliet Gardiner, The 1940s house (Pan Macmillan Ltd, 2002) p.69, Ziegler, London, p.25
[29] Hylton, Their darkest, p.109
[30] (J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
[31] Gardiner, The 1940s, p.67
[32] Calder, The peoples, p.187
[33] Francis Beckett, Remembering the blitz (Retrieved 20th November 2010) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/sep/07/remembering-the-blitz-francis-beckett>
[34] Francis Beckett, Remembering the blitz (Retrieved 20th November 2010) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/sep/07/remembering-the-blitz-francis-beckett>
[35] Mackay, The Test, p.128
[36] Mackay, Half, p.35
[37] Calder, The peoples, p.24
[38] Gardiner, The 1940s, p.36
[39] Ziegler, London, p.157
[40] Angus Calder, The peoples, p.184
[41] Ponting, 1940 Myth, p.163
[42] Angus Calder, The peoples, p.26
[43] Ponting, 1940 Myth, p.164
[44] (J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
[45] Sheridan, Wartime women, p.63
[46] Jeremy Noakes, The Civilian in war, the home front in Europe, Japan and the USA in World War 2 (University of Exeter Press, 1992) p.23
[47] Noakes, The Civilian, p.24
[48] Sheridan, Wartime women, pp.64-67
[49] Mackay, Half, p.32
[50] Martin L Parsons, I’ll take that one, dispelling the myths of civilian evacuation 1939-45 (Beckett Karlson Ltd, 1998) pp.176-178
[51] Mackay, Half, p.167
[52] Ziegler, London, p.59
[53] Pam Schweitzer, Goodnight Children Everywhere, memories of evacuation in World War 2 (Age Exchange Theatre Trust, 1990) p.44
[54] Schweitzer, Goodnight, p.44
[55] Calder, The peoples, p.45
[56] Ziegler, London, p.57
[57] Parsons, I’ll take that, p.178
[58] (J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
[59] Calder, The peoples, p.47
[60] Ziegler, London, p.59, Calder, The peoples, p.45
[61] Mackay, The Test, p.166
[62] Schweitzer, Goodnight, p.244
[63] Calder, The peoples, p.43
[64] Calder, The peoples, p.47
[65] Parsons, I’ll take that, p.200
[66] Parsons, I’ll take that, p.179
[67] (K. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd, 2010)
[68] London Metropolitan Archives, 67.0 ILN, The illustrated London News, August 10th, 1940
[69] Hylton, Their darkest, p.103
[70] Victor T.C. Smith, Defending London’s river (North Kent Books, 1985) p.44
[71] Winston S Churchill, The Second World War Volume 3, The Grand Alliance (Cassell and Co.Ltd, 1950) p.40
[72] David Childs, Britain since 1939, Progress and decline, second edition (Palgrave, 2002) p.46
[73] Ziegler, London, p.31
[74] Angus Calder, The peoples War, p.31
[75] Mackay, The Test, p.43
[76] Calder, The peoples War, p.31
[77] Mackay, Half, p.36
[78] Paul Fussel, Wartime, understanding and behaviour in the Second World War (Oxford University Press, 1989) p.21
[79] Gardiner, Wartime, pp.365-366
[80] Brigadier OFG Hogg, TheRoyal Arsenal, its background origin and subsequent history, Volume 2 (Oxford University Press, 1963) p.1019
[81] Hogg, The Royal, p.1022
[82] Hogg, The Royal, p.1023
[83] (J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
[84] Mackay, The Test, p.138
[85] (J. Carr, personal communication, December 2nd 2010)
[86] Raynes Minns, Bombers and mash, the domestic front 1939-45 (Virago, 1980) p.41
[87] Penny Summerfield, Women workers in the Second World War, production and patriarchy in conflict (Croom Helm Ltd, 1984) p.8
[88] Summerfield, Women, p.9
[89] Summerfield, Women, p.22
[90] Ziegler, London, pp.184-185
[91] Ziegler, London, pp.184-185
[92] Summerfield, Women, p.55
[93] Summerfield, Women, p.60
[94] Summerfield, Women, p.56
[95] Minns, Bombers, p.53
[96] Summerfield, Women, p.34
[97] Sheridan, Wartime women, p.133
[98] Summerfield, Women, p.34
[99] Minns, Bombers, p.51
[100] Minns, Bombers, p.51
[101] Summerfield, Women, p.37
[102] Minns, Bombers, p.10
[103] Summerfield, Women, p.47
[104] Summerfield, Women, p.31
[105] Sue Bruley, Working for victory, a diary of life in the Second World War factory (Sutton Publishing, 2002) pp. x-xx
[106] Summerfield, Women, p.94
[107] Mackay, The Test, p.146
[108] Ziegler, London, p.179